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Key questions
What is already known?
 ► There has been increasing criticism over Public 
Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) 
declarations and non- declarations by public health 
and international law experts.
 ► Critics have claimed that the rationale used by 
Emergency Committees (ECs) to recommend or not 
recommend a PHEIC to the WHO Director- General 
can be contradictory, non- transparent and, in some 
cases, in direct violation of the criteria as defined by 
the International Health Regulations (IHR).
What are the new findings?
 ► We conducted the first, comprehensive, formal re-
view and analysis of official statements published 
on behalf of ECs by the WHO to definitively identify 
the rationale reported for declaring or not declaring a 
PHEIC and analyse how that rationale matches with 
criteria set forth by the IHR.
 ► There was considerable inconsistency and applica-
tion of the criteria for a PHEIC as defined by the IHR.
What do the new findings imply?
 ► A more standardised and transparent process for 
ECs is needed to assess the event and determine if a 
PHEIC declaration is warranted for the public health 
community to understand the decision- making 
process.
 ► Guidelines that include the standardised definitions 
and how they should be assessed for each of the 
three core IHR criteria is necessary for future PHEIC 
declarations to ensure confidence in the IHR EC pro-
cess remains.
AbsTrACT
Introduction Nine events have been assessed for 
potential declaration of a Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern (PHEIC). A PHEIC is defined as an 
extraordinary event that constitutes a public health risk 
to other states through international spread and requires 
a coordinated international response. The WHO Director- 
General convenes Emergency Committees (ECs) to provide 
their advice on whether an event constitutes a PHEIC. 
The EC rationales have been criticised for being non- 
transparent and contradictory to the International Health 
Regulations (IHR). This first comprehensive analysis of EC 
rationale provides recommendations to increase clarity 
of EC decisions which will strengthen the IHR and WHO’s 
legitimacy in future outbreaks.
Methods 66 EC statements were reviewed from nine 
public health outbreaks of influenza A, Middle East 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus, polio, Ebola virus 
disease, Zika, yellow fever and coronavirus disease-2019. 
Statements were analysed to determine which of the 
three IHR criteria were noted as contributing towards the 
EC’s justification on whether to declare a PHEIC and what 
language was used to explain the decision.
results Interpretation of the criteria were often vague 
and applied inconsistently. ECs often failed to describe and 
justify which criteria had been satisfied.
Discussion Guidelines must be developed for the 
standardised interpretation of IHR core criteria. The 
ECs must clearly identify and justify which criteria 
have contributed to their rationale for or against PHEIC 
declaration.
Conclusion Striving for more consistency and 
transparency in EC justifications would benefit future 
deliberations and provide more understanding and support 
for the process.
InTroDuCTIon
In the aftermath of severe acute respira-
tory syndrome (SARS) outbreak, the WHO 
fundamentally revised the International 
Health Regulations (IHR), which entered 
into force in 2007. The 196 States Parties 
to the IHR recognised that certain public 
health events pose a significant risk to the 
global community and should be desig-
nated as a Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern (PHEIC). Under 
Article I of the IHR, a PHEIC is defined 
by three criteria: an extraordinary event 
which ‘constitute[s] a public health risk to 
other States through international spread of 
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disease and…potentially require[s] a coordinated inter-
national response.’ The IHR (Annex 2) provides a ‘deci-
sion instrument’ that guides States Parties as to which 
health events have the potential to become PHEICs, 
thus requiring reporting to WHO. [Annex 2 of the IHR 
provides a decision instrument for States Parties to assess 
which events detected by national surveillance systems 
would require notification to the WHO. This includes 
a single case of smallpox, poliomyelitis due to wild- type 
poliovirus, human influenza caused by a new subtype 
and SARS. Other health events that have the potential 
to cause international public health concerns or serious 
impact trigger an algorithm to determine if notification 
to WHO is required. Criteria for this algorithm include 
determining if the event is serious, unusual or unex-
pected, has a significant risk of international spread, or 
poses a significant risk of international travel or trade 
restrictions. If two of the criteria are true, then notifi-
cation to WHO is required under the IHR]. The IHR 
also empowers the WHO Director- General (DG) to 
convene an Emergency Committee (EC) which consists 
of international experts brought together on an ad- hoc 
basis. The EC provides their advice on whether the 
current situation should be considered a PHEIC, and 
what Temporary Recommendations should be given to 
Member States to bolster the response and control the 
outbreak. Ultimately, however, the WHO DG has sole 
authority to declare a PHEIC and make Temporary 
Recommendations for Member States to follow.1
The WHO’s decision- making under the IHR has come 
under intense scrutiny, especially its decision whether 
to declare a PHEIC. Global commissions, for example, 
strongly criticised the organisation for waiting 4 months 
after international spread of Ebola virus disease (EVD) 
in West Africa (2014–2016) before declaring an emer-
gency.2 During the ongoing EVD outbreak in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the EC met a total of six 
times but did not declare a PHEIC until the fourth convo-
cation, more than 11 months after the outbreak began.3 4 
Most recently, the WHO’s judgement in response to coro-
navirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) has been questioned. 
The WHO DG first convened the EC on January 22, but 
announced it had insufficient data from China to arrive at 
a decision. The following day, the EC was almost equally 
divided, but ultimately said it was too early to declare 
a PHEIC. Seven days later, on 30 January 2020 during 
the second EC meeting, the DG declared a PHEIC. The 
WHO DG openly stated that the IHR should be reformed 
to allow intermediate levels for declaring an emergency, 
suggesting that an all or nothing standard hindered EC 
decision- making.3 5
Experts have urged WHO to clarify how decisions 
should be reached,6–8 as well as proposing greater trans-
parency in the EC decision- making process to better 
understand why the Committee recommended or did not 
recommend a PHEIC declaration.9 Overall, the IHR EC 
decision- making process is open to considerable interpre-
tation.10 In addition, the WHO DG has raised concerns 
about the negative impacts that PHEIC declarations may 
trigger, especially travel and trade restrictions.3 5
To date, there has yet to be a comprehensive analysis 
of EC recommendations and WHO DG decision- making 
regarding PHEIC declarations. To describe how the EC 
and the WHO DG relied on and interpreted these criteria 
in previous decisions to declare or not to declare PHEICs, 
we examined the EC’s decision- making in all instances 
where it has met from when the revised IHR entered 
into force in 2007. We summarised and categorised the 
justifications offered by the EC, identified the criteria 
used in each situation and compared these to criteria for 
PHEICs outlined by the IHR. Based on this analysis, we 
offer important recommendations for increasing trans-
parency and consistency in EC recommendations and 
PHEIC decision- making. Adoption of these regulations 
would strengthen IHR decision- making and WHO legiti-
macy in responding to major outbreaks.
MeTHoDs
We searched the WHO’s website for all instances where 
the WHO DG convened an EC from when the revised 
IHR entered into force in 2007. During this review, we 
identified a total of nine public health events for which 
ECs were convened: the influenza A (H1N1) pandemic 
(2009–2010), the Middle East respiratory syndrome coro-
navirus (MERS- CoV) outbreak (2013–2015), the inter-
national spread of poliovirus (2014- ongoing), the West 
Africa EVD outbreak (2014–2016), the Zika virus outbreak 
(2016), yellow fever (2016), the 9th EVD outbreak in 
the Equateur province of DRC (2018), the 10th EVD 
outbreak in DRC which began in the North Kivu and Ituri 
provinces (2018- ongoing) and the on- going epidemic of 
COVID-19. We identified the number of EC meetings 
that were convened for each health event and collected 
the official statements detailing the WHO DG’s decision 
and the EC’s justification. While EC meetings were often 
followed by a press conference where the WHO DG and 
the chair of the EC reported on their internal discussions 
and ultimate decision as well as answered questions from 
journalists, it was decided that these discussions would 
not be included in the scope of this study. For each of 
the aforementioned health events, we also identified and 
recorded epidemiological characteristics of the outbreaks 
including date of detection, date of initial EC meeting, 
number of countries affected prior to initial EC meeting 
as well as the total number of countries affected, and the 
average case fatality rate reported over the course of the 
outbreak.
There were a total of 66 EC meetings for review (H1N1 
(n=9), MERS- CoV (n=10), polio (n=22), West Africa 
EVD (n=9), Zika (n=5), yellow fever (n=2), ninth EVD 
in DRC (n=1), 10th EVD in DRC (n=6), COVID-19 
(n=2)).3 4 Each EC statement was analysed to determine 
which of the three fundamental IHR criteria were noted 
as contributing towards the EC’s justification on whether 
to declare a PHEIC, and specifically, what language was 
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used by the EC to explain their decision- making process. 
[In accordance with the definition of a PHEIC outlined 
in the IHR, the three fundamental criteria we searched 
for included whether the situation constituted an extraor-
dinary event, if there was a ‘public health risk to other 
States via international spread’, and whether a coordi-
nated international response was required.] In addition, 
we identified and recorded other thematic factors that 
contributed either to the determination of the three 
essential IHR criteria or overall decision to declare a 
PHEIC. These factors included: sustained community 
transmission, gaps in knowledge of the agent or limited 
response experience, impending mass gatherings, threat 
to eradication and complex response settings.
Patient and public involvement
Patients and the public were not involved in this study.
resulTs
Of the nine events analysed, PHEICs were declared in six 
instances: H1N1 in 2009, Poliovirus in 2014, West Africa 
EVD outbreak in 2014, Zika outbreak in 2016, the 10th 
DRC EVD outbreak in North Kivu and Ituri provinces in 
2019, and the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak (table 1).3 4 
Detailed information on each EC meeting and the criteria 
identified as contributing to the rationale of EC justifica-
tions can be found in online supplementary file 1.
H1n1 pandemic
Approximately 1 month after initial cases were detected, 
the first EC was convened and a PHEIC declared. The 
EC indicated that all three conditions for a PHEIC had 
been met: the event was considered extraordinary, there 
was a public health risk to other States via international 
spread, and an international response was required to 
control the outbreak. The EC met a total of nine times 
throughout the pandemic but did not recommend the 
PHEIC be declared over until 10 August 2010 as it ‘no 
longer represented an extraordinary event,’ the ‘world 
was no longer experiencing an influenza pandemic,’ 
and the response did not require ‘immediate emergency 
actions on an international scale’.3
Middle east respiratory syndrome coronavirus
While regular notifications of MERS- CoV cases were 
reported to WHO for 2012–2013, approximately 10 
months following the initial notification on 22 September 
2012, the WHO DG convened the EC to independently 
offer an expert review of the situation regarding this 
novel virus. At the first meeting on 9 July 2013, the EC 
determined that more information was needed, and 
further time was warranted for deliberation, therefore it 
was agreed that the Committee would meet in 8 days to 
provide a decision. The EC met a total of 10 times between 
9 July 2013 and 2 September 2015 and a PHEIC was not 
declared at any point.3 Numerous countries reported 
MERS- CoV cases, thus indicating there was a public health 
risk to other countries through international spread.11 12 
In 2015, South Korea reported 186 laboratory- confirmed 
cases and 38 deaths, the largest outbreak outside of the 
Middle East.13 That same year, on 2 September 2015, the 
EC noted that ‘[p]rogress is not yet sufficient to control 
this threat and until this is achieved, individual countries 
and the global community will remain at significant risk 
for further outbreaks.’ Despite being a novel virus, the 
EC did not consider the MERS- CoV outbreaks to be an 
extraordinary event. While the EC did not explicitly state 
that a coordinated international response was required, 
in their final meeting they noted that ‘sectors must collab-
orate, among themselves and internationally,’ implying a 
coordinated international response was necessary.3
Polio
The first EC meeting, on 28–29 April 2014, was convened 
to discuss the international spread of wild poliovirus in 
2014 and its threat to the global polio eradication initi-
ative. The difference between the low transmission rates 
for poliovirus in 2012 and early 2013 compared to a rapid 
increase in transmission rates in late 2013 and into 2014 
brought concern that eradication efforts were at risk. The 
Committee reported all conditions for a PHEIC were 
met. Since 28 April 2014, the EC convened an additional 
21 times and deemed the PHEIC declaration should 
continue as the risk of international spread and need 
for a coordinated international response remained. The 
Committee also argued that the extraordinary context 
of being close to polio eradication and the concern of 
complacency threatening the eradication efforts support 
the argument to continue the PHEIC declaration.3
West Africa eVD
The WHO published the official notification of the 
outbreak on 23 March 2014.14 The first EC was convened 
over 4 months later on 6–7 August 2014 after cases had 
been reported from Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone. The Committee determined the outbreak consti-
tuted an extraordinary event, posed a public health risk to 
other States through international spread, and required 
a coordinated international response to control the virus, 
therefore concluding the ‘conditions for a (PHEIC) have 
been met.’3
Zika virus
Two months after the Pan American Health Organization 
and WHO published an epidemiological alert regarding 
an increase in neurological disorders in areas where Zika 
was reported,15 on 1 February 2016 the EC was convened 
to deliberate on whether a PHEIC was constituted.3 
While 25 countries in the Americas had reported cases of 
Zika,16 17 there was no mention of the public health risk 
to other States through international spread in the initial 
meeting where a PHEIC was declared. The Committee 
also did not note whether a coordinated international 
response was required. There was no mention in this 
meeting that the event was considered extraordinary. 
However, language from a later EC meeting on 18 
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November 2016 indicated that the unknown, apparent 
association between Zika and neurological disorders 
was considered an extraordinary event. [The EC did not 
determine that Zika itself was a PHEIC, but rather the 
report of Zika cases with the additional concern of neuro-
logical disorders constituted a PHEIC]. The EC met a 
total of five times from February 2016 to 18 November 
2016 and noted the gaps in knowledge of the virus and 
its consequences.3
Yellow fever
Four months after notification of yellow fever cases in 
Angola,18 the WHO DG convened an EC on 19 May 
2016. There was international spread of yellow fever to 
DRC, China and Kenya, and the Committee noted the 
international risk posed by the outbreak. It also called 
for international support for the response. Yet, the EC 
determined the event did not constitute a PHEIC. The 
Committee met a second time on 31 August 2016 and 
reported similar findings. During both meetings, the 
Committee made no note on whether the outbreak was 
considered an extraordinary event.3
eVD DrC (equateur)
The ninth EVD outbreak of DRC was declared by its 
Ministry of Health on 8 May 2018 in the Equateur prov-
ince19 and 10 days later the WHO DG convened the EC. 
The Committee reported that the conditions for a PHEIC 
had not been met. While the Committee noted that the 
public health risk of international spread was high, they 
considered that the robust, coordinated response by the 
DRC government, WHO and partners and ‘the inter-
ventions underway provide[d] strong reason to believe 
that the outbreak can be brought under control.’ The 
Committee also noted that there was no actual interna-
tional spread, which appeared to impact their decision 
not to declare a PHEIC as they noted ‘[i]f the outbreak 
expands significantly, or if there is international spread, 
the Emergency Committee will be reconvened.’ The 
Committee made no mention on whether the event 
was considered extraordinary. Due to the brevity of the 
outbreak, only one EC meeting was convened.3
eVD DrC (north Kivu and Ituri)
On 17 October 2018 the WHO DG convened the first 
EC for DRC’s 10th EVD outbreak, centred in the North 
Kivu and Ituri provinces. A PHEIC was not declared until 
the fourth EC meeting on 17 July 2019. The Committee 
expressed in multiple meetings that a PHEIC declaration 
may be detrimental to the ongoing response. For example, 
in the second EC meeting, the Committee noted ‘there 
is no added benefit to declaring a PHEIC at this stage,’ 
and in the third EC meeting, ‘[t]he Committee exten-
sively debated the impact of a PHEIC declaration on the 
response, possible unintended consequences, and how 
these might be managed.’ During the first two meetings, 
while the EC reported that while there was a high risk 
of spread at the national and regional levels, it did not 
think that transnational spread beyond bordering coun-
tries was likely. The Committee gave no indication as to 
whether the noted risk of regional spread met the IHR 
criterion of a ‘public health risk to other States through 
international spread’. However, during the third EC 
meeting on 14 June 2019 the Committee ‘acknowledged 
that recent cases in Uganda constitute international 
spread of disease’ and considered the outbreak had a 
risk of international spread. The Committee called for 
the DRC government, WHO, and partners to intensify 
the response to ensure the situation did not deteriorate 
during earlier meetings, but it did not specifically state 
a coordinated international response was needed until 
the fourth meeting. During the third EC, the Committee 
explicitly reported the event as extraordinary, acknowl-
edged the risk of the disease spreading to neighbouring 
countries—as cases had been reported in Uganda—
and called for the international community to ‘step up 
funding and support’ for the response. However, the EC 
still stated that the outbreak ‘[did] not meet all the three 
criteria for a PHEIC’ at the time.1 It was not until the 
following meeting when the Committee stated ‘[i]t was 
the view of the Committee that a coordinated interna-
tional response under the International Health Regula-
tions (2005) is required. Thus, the conditions for a Public 
Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) 
under the IHR (2005) have been met.’3 The EC has met 
an additional two times and advised for a continuation of 
a PHEIC declaration as ‘[t]he Committee was concerned 
that withdrawing the PHEIC now might have adverse 
consequences for the response efforts through dimin-
ishing focus.’3 4
Coronavirus disease-2019
China notified WHO of a cluster of pneumonia cases 
with unknown aetiology on 31 December 2019,20 and 
the WHO DG convened the EC approximately 3 weeks 
later on 22–23 January 2020. At the time, 557 cases were 
reported, and four countries confirmed exported (travel- 
related) cases from China. Similar to previous EC meet-
ings for MERS, polio and West Africa Ebola, the first EC 
meeting for novel coronavirus did not reach a decision 
on the first day of meeting, but continued its delibera-
tions on the next day due to the need for additional 
information and deliberation. In the EC statement, the 
Committee noted that ‘it is expected that further inter-
national exportation of cases may appear in any country,’ 
implying an ongoing public health risk to other States 
via international spread. While it was reported that 
‘members of the Emergency Committee expressed diver-
gent views on whether this event constitutes a PHEIC 
or not,’ ultimately a PHEIC was not declared at the end 
of 23 January. As seen with MERS- CoV, the WHO DG 
suggested the EC reconvene in a matter of days to reas-
sess the evolving situation and provide an updated deter-
mination on whether the event constitutes a PHEIC. The 
EC met again on 30 January 2020, when there were 7711 
confirmed cases in China and an additional 83 reported 
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Figure 1 Outlines which criteria and thematic factors were explicitly stated or implied as contributing to the Emergency 
Committee recommendation to the WHO Director- General. COVID-19, coronavirus disease-2019; EVD, Ebola virus disease; 
H1N1, influenza A; MERS, Middle East respiratory syndrome; PHEIC, Public Health Emergency of International Concern.
cases in 18 other countries, at which time the EC ‘agreed 
that the outbreak now meets the criteria for a Public 
Health Emergency of International Concern.’ The EC 
reiterated its language from the prior meeting regarding 
risk of importation, indicating an ongoing public health 
risk to other States via international spread. Additionally, 
the EC stated in the second meeting that they ‘felt that 
a global coordinated effort is needed.’ Neither the first 
nor second EC meeting noted whether or not the event 
was considered extraordinary.3 At the time of writing, 
COVID-19 was reported in countries on six continents, 
spreading rapidly including through community trans-
mission.21
DIsCussIon
Figure 13 4 outlines which criteria and thematic factors 
were explicitly stated or implied as contributing to the EC 
recommendation to the WHO DG.
We find considerable inconsistency in statements issued 
by the EC regarding their determination of whether 
the IHR criteria for a PHEIC have been met. The ECs 
did not always require each of the three conditions to 
be met in order to recommend that a PHEIC should 
be declared. During the first Zika EC meeting when a 
PHEIC was recommended, there was no explicit mention 
of a risk of international spread nor did the EC state that 
a coordinated, international response was required. In 
contrast, the EC determined the yellow fever outbreaks 
in 2016 did not constitute a PHEIC even though they 
stated the outbreaks posed a public health risk to other 
States through international spread and indicated that 
enhanced international support was needed.3
When the ECs did reference specific PHEIC criteria, 
they were often inconsistent in their interpretation of 
whether the criteria were met. For example, for some 
events (H1N1, polio and the West Africa EVD outbreak) 
ECs interpreted the criterion of ‘requiring a coordinated 
international response’ to mean that the event required 
such coordination, but did necessitate that on- going 
coordination be enhanced or improved in order for 
the criterion to be met. In contrast, for the ninth DRC 
EVD outbreak, the EC argued that while the ‘response 
should be supported by the entire international commu-
nity’ implying the need for a coordinated international 
response, a PHEIC was not necessary because the existing 
response was ‘rapid and comprehensive’ and there was 
reason to believe the outbreak could be brought under 
control. Similarly, for the 10th DRC EVD outbreak, in 
earlier meetings, the Committee noted ‘[t]he govern-
ment of the Democratic Republic of Congo, WHO, and 
partners must intensify the current response’ indicating 
a coordinated international response was underway; 
however, the EC did not acknowledge that the criterion 
of a coordinated international response was met until the 
forth EC meeting on 17 July 2019.3
The criterion for determining if an event is consid-
ered extraordinary was also interpreted inconsistently. 
For both H1N1 and Zika, insufficient knowledge about 
the virus was cited as a factor in these situations being 
deemed extraordinary events. In contrast, the EC s never 
stated that MERS- CoV and COVID-19 (both outbreaks 
resulting from novel viruses for which there were signifi-
cant gaps in knowledge of disease aetiology) constituted 
an extraordinary event.3
ECs varied in their interpretation of and the supporting 
evidence used to assess the criterion of there being a 
risk of international spread. The EC was inconsistent 
in whether it required that international spread to have 
already occurred vs there simply being risk that spread 
could occur in order for this criterion to be met. In 
some cases (H1N1, polio, West Africa EVD, yellow fever, 
ninth DRC EVD outbreak, 10th DRC EVD outbreak), 
the EC noted the threat of international spread when a 
disease involved sustained human- to- human or commu-
nity transmission. However, despite the absence of 
sustained human- to- human transmission, the EC consid-
ered MERS- CoV outbreak to have a risk of international 
spread stating ‘the possibility of international spread 
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remains of concern’ on 4 February 2015. For polio, an 
impending mass gathering, the Hajj, was used as ratio-
nale to continue a PHEIC declaration due to the risk it 
posed for international spread. However, for MERS- CoV, 
the EC did not note that they considered the Hajj a factor 
that contributed to the risk of international spread. The 
upcoming Olympics were also acknowledged during 
Zika EC meetings and it was recognised that mass gath-
erings can pose additional risks to international spread. 
It was ultimately deemed that with proper public health 
control measures, the risk of the Olympics contributing 
to international spread was negligible, and therefore, not 
factored into this criterion.3
By design, this study only reviewed the official state-
ments of EC meetings to identify and analyse the ratio-
nale provided and determine if PHEIC criteria were 
present or absent. Most, but not all, EC meetings were 
followed by a press conference where the DG and the 
chair of the EC provided a verbal report of the meeting 
and answer questions posed by journalists. While these 
press conferences often allowed for further clarification 
of the EC decision, whether or not additional, clarifying 
information was relayed at press conferences was often 
contingent on the types of questions that happened to be 
asked by member of the press. As a result, these confer-
ences cannot be viewed as a replacement for EC reports 
as a vehicle for explaining the rationale used by the EC 
in deciding whether an event met each of IHR criteria 
for a PHEIC declaration. To ensure there is complete 
understanding of the analysis and decision- making of the 
EC, the official reports of the EC should contain all of 
the necessary information regarding which IHR criteria 
were determined to have been. Transparency in this IHR 
process must be prioritised and, therefore, the official EC 
statements must provide a clear indication of how each 
of the three IHR criteria were deemed to have been met 
and include all the relevant information necessary to 
justify the decision to recommend declaration (or not) 
of a PHEIC.
Lack of consistency and clarity regarding the EC and 
the WHO DG’s decision- making contributes to ongoing 
concerns about a lack of transparency in the PHEIC 
process and other public disagreements with PHEIC 
declarations.9 Though ECs may have discussed each 
outbreak with greater clarity and consistency than what 
was publicly reported, it is important that the public repre-
sentation of the EC’s rationale be fully articulated so that 
Member States and outside observers have a full record 
of the EC’s decision- making process. Lack of transpar-
ency surrounding the EC process has been a continuous 
point of contention for public health experts who noted 
the original reticence of WHO to disclose the identity of 
EC members following the H1N1 EC deliberations.22
Similarly, it is important that the EC’s recommenda-
tions are seen as consistent with the expectations of the 
IHR.
We recommend that in future convenings, the EC 
standardise their reviews of events to specifically address 
whether the event met each of the three criteria and to 
list corresponding evidence to support the presence/
absence of each criterion. In addition, the EC should 
offer detailed explanation of how they interpreted the 
criteria. In order to standardise the EC review process 
and ensure explanations are provided to clearly justify 
decisions on PHEIC declarations and non- declarations, 
EC members should undergo further training regarding 
the authorities and decision- making criteria established 
by the IHR, a sentiment that is shared by other public 
health and international law experts.22 Notably, global 
health law experts have not been part of the composition 
of ECs.3 4 Adding legal expertise to future EC delibera-
tions will help to resolve confusion about the IHR criteria 
and promote consistency with previous decisions.
Going forward, the WHO should, in consultation with 
member states and legal experts, develop clear guidelines 
to aid ECs in interpreting PHEIC criteria. In particular, 
there seems to be confusion among EC members as to 
whether the ‘risk of international spread’ criterion has to 
involve documented international spread. The IHRs do 
not specify that international spread must have already 
occurred and it would likely be against the spirit of the 
IHRs, which aim to reduce international spread of infec-
tious diseases, for the ECs to need to wait until interna-
tional spread has occurred in order to declare a PHEIC.1
The makeup of the EC is ill- equipped to address 
political and social considerations. While these consid-
erations are important and relevant factors to take into 
account when responding to an outbreak, the IHR does 
not provide the ECs with the authority to consider the 
political and social implications. The ECs should disavow 
including these concerns in their deliberations and 
ensure that they only consider the available technical 
evidence on whether the three core criteria have or have 
not been met when determining if the event constitutes a 
PHEIC. Other avenues should be used to account for the 
political and social considerations as they are a necessary 
component of ensuring a robust and successful response 
to a health emergency. Box 1 provides a summary of the 
recommendations outlined in this paper.
With more consistency and transparency in EC justifica-
tions, there could be a better understanding on how the 
EC and the WHO DG reach their decision on whether 
an event should be considered a PHEIC. Similarly, as 
previous PHEIC determinations are often reviewed to 
compare the decision- making processes between public 
health events, a more structured approach should be 
provided that explicitly states what criteria were met and 
how the EC determined that each criterion was satisfied. 
This approach will remove some ambiguity and enable 
the international community to gain further insight into 
the EC’s thought process and their recommendations on 
whether to declare a PHEIC.
It is essential for PHEIC declarations to be made based 
on science, not politics. In recent convenings, ECs have 
seemed reluctant to recommend a PHEIC declaration, 
noting the potential for countries to respond with trade 
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box 1 summary of recommendations
1. Emergency Committees (ECs) should standardise their review of 
an outbreak to specifically address whether the event met each of 
the criteria for a Public Health Emergency of International Concern 
(PHEIC); the outbreak should constitute as an extraordinary event, 
be a public health risk to other Member States though interna-
tional spread of disease, and require a coordinated, international 
response.
2. WHO should include global health law experts in the composi-
tion of future EC meetings to ensure proper legal advice on the 
International Health Regulations criteria can be shared with EC 
members and properly applied during the decision- making process.
3. WHO, Member States and legal experts should develop clear guide-
lines to aid ECs in interpreting PHEIC criteria.
4. ECs should only consider the available technical evidence of events 
when determine if criteria for a PHEIC are met rather than incor-
porating additional considerations in the deliberations such as the 
political implications.
5. The EC should endeavour to provide clear and consistent state-
ments outlining the decision- making process for PHEIC declara-
tions. This would include a standardised statement reviewing their 
discussions and listing evidence to support their determination of 
the presence or absence of each PHEIC criterion.
and travel measures that could harm response to the 
health event.3 23 Though concerns that countries may 
pursue harmful measures to stop the importation of 
disease are legitimate,24 the decision- making process 
established by the IHR does not accommodate these 
political considerations.1 The ECs should review the 
potential public health impact of the event and limit 
their decision- making to a technical assessment of each 
event. The WHO should address separately, outside of 
the PHEIC declaration process, the problem of Member 
States taking actions that are inconsistent with WHO 
recommendations and place unnecessary travel and 
trade restrictions on affected countries, which would be 
detrimental to both the country and the response efforts.
PHEIC declarations are not the entire focus of the 
IHR. The Regulations also require countries to develop 
capacities to detect and report potential PHEICs.1 If 
there is a lack of understanding of the rationale that EC 
uses to recommend PHEIC declarations, or if PHEIC 
declarations are seen to be political, it could undermine 
confidence in the IHR. Though the IHR are instruments 
of law, their impact depends on countries’ willingness 
to comply. It is essential for future compliance with the 
IHR that the WHO, ECs and Member States interpret the 
framework as written. If the Regulations are thought to 
be inadequate in supporting assessment and response to 
international public health emergencies, then a revision 
of the IHR may be necessary. Following the EC’s recom-
mendation to declare the on- going COVID-19 epidemic 
a PHEIC, the WHO DG expressed frustration with the 
binary decision- making set up by the IHRs and suggested 
that a tiered decision- making tool, with an interme-
diary measure, may be more useful to gauge the level of 
emergency posed by health events.3 Such a suggestion 
would likely require a revision of the IHR, as the decision 
instrument contained in Annex 2 does not accommodate 
a multi- phase declaration.
ConClusIon
This first comprehensive review of EC statements found 
considerable inconsistency in the justifications dictating 
which criteria were considered to be met and how the 
criteria were considered to be satisfied. Recently debates 
about the value and timing of PHEIC declarations have 
also called into question the benefit and impact of PHEIC 
declarations.25 26 Some of these concerns may stem from 
lack of understanding of EC’s rationale and EC’s lack of 
agreement and/or understanding of PHEIC criteria set 
forth by the IHR. Striving for more consistency and trans-
parency in the EC justifications around PHEIC decla-
rations would benefit future deliberations and help to 
build more understanding and support for the process.
Twitter Lucia Mullen @LuciaMullen17
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